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                                               NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
                                 
                 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
                     FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
                                                
                                 
                          No. 01-2584 
                                                
                                 
                     PRUDENTIAL REAL ESTATE 
                        AFFILIATES, INC. 
                                 
                               v. 
                                 
              PPR REALTY, INC.; RONALD CROUSHORE; 
                   HELEN SOSSO; KATHY MCKENNA 
                                 
                                                                      
Kathy McKenna, 
 
                                                                           
Appellant 
                                                
                                 
          Appeal from the United States District Court 
            for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
              (D.C. Civil Action No. 99-cv-00873) 
         District Judge: Honorable William L. Standish 
                                                
                                 
           Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
                        February 8, 2002 
                                 
          Before: SLOVITER, and AMBRO, Circuit Judges 
                    SHADUR*, District Judge 
                                 
                                 
                 (Opinion filed March 1, 2002) 
 
                                                
     *Honorable Milton I. Shadur, United States District Judge for the 
Northern District 
of Illinois, sitting by designation. 
 
                                                
                                 
                            OPINION 
                                                
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge: 
 
     In this appeal we decide whether the District Court properly denied 
Appellant 
Kathy McKenna's motion to dissolve the preliminary injunction.  We affirm.  
                               I. 
     Because the facts of this case are well known to the parties, we will 
not recite them 
in detail.  The procedural history of this case is convoluted.  While 
appeals of the 
Pennsylvania arbitration by Helen Sosso and Ronald Croushore were pending, 
Prudential 
Real Estate Affiliates, Inc. ("PREA") filed suit in the United States 
District Court for the 
Central District of California (the "Central District") to obtain a 
preliminary injunction 
against transfer to McKenna of the shares in PPR Realty, Inc. ("PPR") held 
by Sosso and 
Croushore.  Over McKenna's opposition, the motion was granted.  McKenna 
appealed to 
the Ninth Circuit, and then moved that the Central District dissolve the 
preliminary 
injunction.  The Central District held that it lacked jurisdiction to 
consider the motion 
given the pendency of McKenna's appeal before the Ninth Circuit. 
     The Ninth Circuit upheld the preliminary injunction and the Central 
District's 
holding that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the motion to dissolve.  
While the appeals 
were pending, the underlying case was transferred to the United States 
District Court for 
the Western District of Pennsylvania (the "District Court").  Eighteen 
months later, 
McKenna filed a motion with the District Court to dissolve the injunction.  
That Court 
denied her motion, and McKenna appealed.  
                              II. 
     This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.  1332 because the 
parties are citizens 
of different states and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.  
McKenna argues that 
this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because "the plaintiff and 
defendants Sosso, 
Croushore, and PPR have been aligned in all motions in this case,"  
Appellant's Br. at 1, 
thus destroying diversity jurisdiction.  The Ninth Circuit considered this 
question at 
length and determined that "[r]especting the ultimate right to purchase 
the stock that is the 
primary matter in dispute in this case, Sosso, Croushore, and PPR are 
either disinterested, 
or have interests antagonistic to PREA, depending on the outcome of the 
Pennsylvania 
appeal."  Prudential Real Estate Affiliates v. PPR Realty, 204 F.3d 867, 
874 (9th Cir. 
2000).  It reasoned that, by virtue of the Pennsylvania arbitration, Sosso 
and Croushore 
have no claim in the ownership of the stock, and are mere "constructive 
trustees with no 
stake in the outcome except to be released of their charge."  Id. at 873.   
     McKenna claims that PREA's "exit strategy" is to sell the stock back 
to Sosso and 
Croushore, but the evidence she offers fails to establish that PREA's 
interests are aligned 
with Sosso's and Croushore's.  On the contrary, the memorandum she cites 
indicates 
PREA's desire to obtain benefits from the acquisition, and then pursue 
"exit options" once 
the acquisition is no longer profitable.  Because McKenna fails to provide 
evidence of 
Sosso and Croushore's alignment with PPR, we agree with the Ninth Circuit 
that diversity 
exists.  We therefore possess subject matter jurisdiction. 
                              III. 
     We review the denial of a motion to dissolve an injunction for abuse 
of discretion.  
Favia v. Indiana Univ. of Pa., 7 F.3d 332, 340 (3d Cir. 1993); Township of 
Franklin 
Sewerage Auth. v. Middlesex Co. Util. Auth., 787 F.2d 117, 120 (3d Cir. 
1986).  In order 
to modify an injunction there must be "a change of circumstances between 
entry of the 
injunction and the filing of the motion that would render the continuance 
of the injunction 
in its original form inequitable."  Favia, 7 F.3d at 337.  Similarly, to 
dissolve an 
injunction a district court must consider "whether the movant has made a 
showing that 
changed circumstances warrant the discontinuation of the order."  Franklin 
Sewerage 
Auth., 787 F.2d at 121. 
     McKenna advances many arguments for dissolving the injunction, nearly 
all of 
which fail to allege the changed circumstances required to dissolve an 
injunction.  Each 
of her arguments was made or could have been made before the Central 
District.  
     The principal changed circumstance she alleges involves the 
declaration of Bryan 
Shreckengost, the attorney for Sosso and Croushore, who claimed that Judge 
Eugene 
Strassburger, III, of the Court of Common Pleas for Allegheny County, 
Pennsylvania, 
"suggested that if the arbitration award was confirmed, it might be 
appropriate to allow 
the Federal Court in California some reasonable amount of time to be 
advised of and to 
consider the issues presented to it by PREA."  McKenna argued before the 
Central 
District that this declaration was false, but that Court issued the 
injunction anyway, and 
McKenna appealed.  Judge Strassburger subsequently called the Shreckengost 
declaration 
"absolutely incorrect."  McKenna then petitioned the Central District to 
dissolve its 
injunction, but the Court declined to consider the motion given the 
pendency of 
McKenna's appeal of the preliminary injunction.  Because the Ninth Circuit 
simply 
affirmed the Central District's ruling that it lacked jurisdiction to 
consider a motion to 
vacate a preliminary injunction during the pendency of an appeal, 
Prudential Real Estate, 
204 F.3d at 880, McKenna argues that no court has considered Judge 
Strassburger's 
statement.  Appellant's Br. at 61. 
     In identifying Judge Strassburger's statement, McKenna presents this 
Court with a 
"changed circumstance" to support her motion to dissolve the preliminary 
injunction.  
The District Court held that Judge Strassburger's statement, although a 
"changed 
circumstance," did not render the continued imposition of the preliminary 
injunction 
inequitable, and so did not warrant dissolving the injunction.  It was 
correct.  McKenna 
did not support her assertion that this false evidence "tainted" her case 
before the Central 
District.  The Central District's findings of fact make no mention of 
Shreckengost's 
declaration at all.  She was able to argue the declaration's falsity 
before the California 
federal courts, albeit without the benefit of Judge Strassburger's 
statement.  In the absence 
of any evidence of the Central District's reliance upon Shreckengost's 
declaration, the 
District Court did not abuse its discretion in holding it equitable to 
continue the 
injunction. 
     McKenna next argues that "even PREA's main affiant from the 
preliminary 
injunction proceedings now admits that Kathy McKenna did not breach the 
franchise 
agreement."  Appellant's Br. at 46.  It is true that Elliot S. Rose, Vice 
President of 
Network Services for PREA, testified at a deposition that occurred after 
the Central 
District issued the preliminary injunction that he "knew of no instance 
where McKenna 
was in breach or didn't comply" with her obligations under the franchise 
agreement.  
Appellant's Br. at 46.  McKenna claims that this testimony amounts to an 
abandonment of 
Rose's prior affidavit, where he stated "Kathy McKenna has objected to the 
transfer of 
the Disputed Stock to PREA, and is now refusing to allow PREA to exercise 
its right of 
first refusal."  The District Court, far from abusing its discretion, 
stated the matter clearly:  
          This is the only statement in the affidavit that could possibly 
be interpreted 
     as a statement regarding conduct of McKenna that amounts to an 
alleged 
     breach of contract, and regardless of the purported disclaimer of Mr. 
Rose, 
     the statement is true in that McKenna does dispute PREA's right of 
first 
     refusal and does object to the transfer of the disputed shares to 
PREA.  If 
     the statement were not true . . . the parties would not presently be 
before the 
     court.   
 
     One final changed circumstance does exist. The Ninth Circuit 
explained that the 
reason for imposing the preliminary injunction was because Sosso, 
Croushore, and PPR 
wished to "[prohibit] transfer of the stock while their appeal is resolved 
in Pennsylvania 
state court."  Prudential Real Estate, 204 F.3d at 873.  The resolution of 
the state court 
appeal means that this purpose no longer exists.  Nonetheless, maintaining 
the 
preliminary injunction remains necessary to prevent McKenna from 
transferring the stock 
while the underlying merits of the parties' respective rights are decided.  
Hence, we will 
not dissolve the injunction.    
                              VI. 
     For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the District Court's denial of 
McKenna's 
motion to dissolve the preliminary injunction.                         
 
                                                               
 
TO THE CLERK: 
 








                              /s/ Thomas L. Ambro  
                              Circuit Judge 
